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The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act*
Professor Cox, who was an advisor to Senator Kennedy
during the congressional consideration of labor legislation,
analyzes three salient modifications of the Taft-Hartley Act
included in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959. The modifications discussed concern
federal-state relations, recognition or organizational picket-
ing, and secondary boycotts, including "hot cargo" contracts.
Archibald Cox**
The labor legislation enacted last summer deals with two principal
branches of labor law: (1) the internal affairs of labor organizations,
including the conduct of union officers and the rights of members,
and (2) labor-management relations. The new labor-management
relations law, which is the subject of this paper, is contained in
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act' which, although
-es radical than the Taft-Hartley amendments, 2 nevertheless make
important changes, especially in the rules governing federal and
state jurisdiction, recognition or organizational picketing, and sec-
ondary boycotts.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDMENTS
The Kennedy-Ives 3 and Kennedy-Ervin 4 bills were based upon
four propositions.
First, strong independent labor unions are essential institutions
in American society. The abuses revealed by the McClellan hearings
tainted only a small minority.
* The substance of this paper was delivered as a speech before the Labor Law
Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association on November 6, 1959. The author
vishes to make it plain that although he has tried to achieve a measure of academic
detachment, his participation in a tense legislative struggle, even if only as an
adviser, probably left him with the shortcomings of a protagonist.
** Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1952).
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
3. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).4. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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Second, there was a demonstrated need for legislation which
would check financial malpractices in union administration or labor-
management relations and guarantee union members an opportunity
for democratic self-government. Removing the cancer would not
only safeguard union members but help to restore public confidence
in organized labor. It was the duty of the federal government to
take such measures because labor unions enjoyed their power by
virtue of federal statutes, chiefly the National Labor Relations Act.
Third, since self-determination is preferable to government regu-
lation, the interference with internal union affairs should be held to
a minimum.
Fourth, legislation requiring internal union reforms should be
kept separate from Taft-Hartley amendments. A reform bill would
deal with financial reporting, accounting practices, union elections,
membership requirements, the imposition of fiduciary duties upon
union officials and the regulation of trusteeships and other forms of
international supervision, and like subjects all of which are matters
between the union, its officers and its members. Secondary boycotts,
organizational picketing and other Taft-Hartley amendments would
relate to union organization, collective bargaining and labor dis-
putes, that is, to the balance of power between management and
labor. If the two were confused, the need for internal reforms could
all too easily be converted into an occasion for enacting amend-
ments designed to hamper further unionization and weaken the
bargaining power of existing unions vis-a'-vis employers. Union
members could scarcely be expected to rid themselves of corrupt
officials if the cause of reform were confused with labor disputes
or wages and conditions of employment.
Although the soundness of this fourth proposition seemed beyond
dispute, it immediately ran into the harsh realities of Washington
politics. There was no chance of enacting legislation without the
support of one of the two powerful lobbies interested in labor
legislation.
Business groups showed no genuine interest in reform. Spokesmen
for such groups as the United States Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers beat the drums in an effort to
swell the public outcry against the abuses revealed at the McClellan
hearings in order to obtain support for laws which would strengthen
the bargaining power of management in relation to labor organiza-
tions.
Large segments of organized labor opposed any legislation. Other
voices in the labor movement supported a reform bill partly because
they feared that more repressive legislation would otherwise be en-
acted and partly because they believed that reform was both in the
public interest and for the long-run welfare of organized labor. How-
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ever, they were either unable or unwilling to produce effective sup-
port for any bill which did not contain Taft-Hartley amendments
favorable to labor. In retrospect, taking this position was a serious
blunder by the labor movement. Perhaps it was also bad judgment to
yield to the demand, although the ramifications of the latter question
are sheer speculation.
In any event title VI was added to the Kennedy bills in order to
sweeten the medicine. One section would have eliminated the "no
man's land" which the NLRB declined to occupy and from which
state tribunals were nevertheless excluded by Supreme Court de-
cisions.' Another section would have legalized pre-hire contracts in
the construction industry.6 A third redefined the supervisors ex-
empted from the NLRA,7 but the Senate Labor Committee cut back
this provision to a trivial definition affecting only the telephone in-
dustry." The committee also added a section authorizing NLRB
regional offices to hold elections after a conference with the inter-
ested parties but without a formal hearing and reference to the
Board in Washington; 9 the change was intended to expedite the
conduct of elections. Another amendment would have repealed the
Taft-Hartley provision which denied replaced economic strikers the
right to vote in NLRB elections."
The Administration bill" adopted the substance of the Kennedy
proposals concerning internal union reforms, with the many little
details which could be called "tougher." The major difference was
in the proposed Taft-Hartley amendments. The administration pro-
posed to eliminate the no man's land by giving the NLRB explicit
authority to decline to exercise any part of its full statutory juris-
diction and authorizing the states to take jurisdiction over the area
from which the NLRB retreated." The provisions dealing with
organizational picketing were rather lengthy, but the net effect was
an outright prohibition.13 The Administration bill stiffened the
Taft-Hartley prohibition upon secondary boycotts.' 4 In addition,
there were Republican "sweeteners" for organized labor, although
a partisan might call them only "sugar substitutes."' 5
5. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1959).
6. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1959).
7. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 605 (1959).
8. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604 (1959).
9. This provision became § 605 of S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
10. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 603 (1959).
11. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
12. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1959).
13. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504 (1959).
14. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1959).
15. The Administration "sweeteners" provided, among other things, for pre-
hearing elections, certification of bargaining representatives in the construction indus-
try without an election, and voting by replaced economic strikers.
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Two developments upon the Senate floor deserve notice:
(1) Picketing for union recognition or organizational purposes
was prohibited for nine months after an NLRB election, and also
during the period in which a contract with a rival union barred an
NLRB election if the union had been lawfully recognized. 6
(2) "Hot cargo" contracts were outlawed in the interstate trucking
industry. 7
In the House of Representatives, the real contest was between a
bill reported by the Labor Committee,' which contained Taft-
Hartley amendments resembling those passed by the Senate, and
the Landrum-Griffin bill,'" the Taft-Hartley amendments of which
were drawn from the Administration bill without the "sweeteners,"
or with the sugar converted to vinegar. The Landrum-Griffin bill
prevailed by a narrow margin.
When the Conference Committee met, it was impossible to argue
that changes in the law of labor-management relations should be
separated from questions of internal reform. The President's de-
mand for Taft-Hartley amendments aroused great support. Both the
House and Senate bills contained Taft-Hartley amendments, al-
though their content was utterly dissimilar. In at least one respect,
therefore, the original strategy worked out very badly. Taft-Hartley
amendments dealing with restrictions upon the activities of labor
unions, the very thing which Senator Kennedy had sought to avoid,
were under discussion because of the ill-fated "sweeteners," al-
though they could otherwise have been defeated. And a whole range
of important subjects was excluded- revision of the organization
and procedures of the NLRB, employer unfair labor practices, NLRB
regulation of collective bargaining, suits to enforce collective bar-
gamning agreements and, most notable today, strikes creating a na-
tional emergency. In my judgment, the diminished chance for legis-
lative action in these fields -the difficulty of putting an acceptable
package of Taft-Hartley amendments together now that the business
lobby has secured its principal goals- is the most unfortunate
consequence of the legislation.
Title VII of the Conference Report, which was adopted by both
Houses and signed by the President,0 deals with a number of sub-
jects. Organized labor secured long-sought amendments: (a) repeal
of the non-Communist affidavits, (b) expedited elections, (c) au-
thority for pre-hire contracts in the construction industry, and (d)
the right of replaced strikers to vote in an NLRB election held with-
16. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 708 (1959), as passed by Senate.
17. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707 (1959), as passed by Senate.
18. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
19. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
20. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch. -, 73 Stat. 519.
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in a year of the commencement of the strike. The three other
salient changes are discussed below.
II. FEDmAL-STATE RELATONS
In the NLRA, Congress asserted federal jurisdiction over unfair
labor practices and questions of representation which "affect" inter-
state commerce.21 The Supreme Court held that the act impliedly
excluded state courts and administrative agencies from the entire
area.22 The NLRB has always refused to hear some cases technically
within its jurisdiction.23 The interplay between this rule and the
Supreme Court decisions created a no man's land in which em-
ployers and labor unions were left without a remedy for unfair labor
practices or a method of resolving questions of representation.
There was unanimous agreement that this injustice should be
eliminated. The dispute concerned the remedy.
The basic philosophy of the Democratic majority among the Sen-
ate conferees and also of Senator Prouty was that there should be
one uniform national labor law for every business affecting inter-
state commerce. And although they would have preferred to have
the NLRB administer the law, they would have considered it a fair
compromise to allow the state labor boards and courts to apply the
federal statute.
Meanwhile the House bill proceeded upon the following two
principles: (1) State tribunals should hear and apply state law in
all cases over which the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction.
(2) The NLRB should have full discretion to determine which cases
the federal government should deal with and which should be left
to state authority.
The impact of the House bill would have depended upon the way
in which the NLRB exercised this broad discretion. If it reverted to
the Republican philosophy of ceding back to the states functions
presently being exercised by the national government, as it had
done in 1954,24 there would be serious retrogression from the idea
of a uniform national labor policy. Thirty-four states have no laws
for conducting representation elections and do nothing to protect
employees against discriminatory discharges and other unfair labor
practices.
The Conference Report eliminated this danger by adding to the
Landrum-Grinm bill a proviso reading:
21. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 9(c), 10(a), 61 Stat. 144, 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), 160(a) (1952).
22. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
23. E.g., Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1948).
24. NLRB Press Release No. 449, July 15, 1954.
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[T]he Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon
August 1, 1959.25
This proviso writes at least ninety per cent of the Senate philos-
ophy into the NLRA. The NLRB standards on August 1, 1959, em-
braced the widest jurisdiction in its history.26 They go far beyond
the 1954 yardsticks and substantially beyond 1950 standards. Under
this amendment, therefore, labor unions enjoy greater protection for
organizational activities and management greater protection against
union unfair practices than was available on any occasion prior to
October, 1958. Within this area, the existing doctrines of federal
pre-emption are impliedly preserved. 7
There is no reason to anticipate difficulty in the administration of
the amendment. The Board may continue to apply existing stand-
ards, or broaden them if it wishes. Unfortunately, the amendment
speaks of jurisdiction over "labor disputes," where it would have
been more consonant with prior legislative and administrative ter-
minology to speak of "unfair labor practices" and "questions of rep-
resentation"; but it is obvious that these proceedings, and not true
disputes, were what the Congress had in mind. I cannot imagine the
Board or a court having any doubt upon the question.
The state courts will be free to apply state law in cases which do
not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards. When a claim of pre-
emption is raised in a concrete case, the state courts will be required
to hear evidence concerning the size of the employer's business, so as
to determine whether the NLRB would exercise jurisdiction under
its published standards. It would be inconsistent with the general
tone of congressional discussion to require a party to apply to the
NLRB and have it decline jurisdiction before seeking relief in a
local tribunal.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL PICKEING
The Landrum-Griffin amendments add a new union unfair labor
practice in NLRA section 8(b) (7), which puts important restraints
upon freedom to picket for recognition as the bargaining representa-
tive or for the purpose of inducing employees to join a union.28
These restrictions are the inevitable consequence of ideas introduced
into our national labor policy in the Wagner Act. An understanding
25. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch.-, § 701, 73
Stat. -, introducing Labor Management Relations Act § 14(c).
26. NLBB Press Release No. 576, October 2, 1958.
27. Two of the many discussions of federal pre-emption in the field of labor law
are Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction of Labor Relations
(pts. 1 & 2), 59 COLum. L. REv. 6, 269 (1959); and Cox, Federalism in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 1Lu~v. L. REv. 1297 (1954).
28. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch.-, § 704(c),
73 Stat.-.
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of the underlying philosophy is also helpful in resolving some of
the difficulties of interpretation.
One cornerstone of national policy, the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
deprived the federal courts of power to issue injunctions against
the use of peaceful strikes, boycotts, or picketing as methods of se-
curing recognition or extending union organization. The Wagner
Act, by giving employees legally protected rights of self-organiza-
tion and collective bargaining made three fundamental changes in
the premises supporting the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
(1) The Norris-LaGuardia view that the law had no useful role
to play in labor disputes, unless there was violence or destruction of
property, became untenable after legal restrictions were imposed
upon the conduct of employers in relation to union organization. No
civilized jurisprudence could tolerate the inconsistency of requiring
a company to bargain exclusively with a union certified by law,
while doing nothing to stop a rival union from injuring the same
employer in order to secure exclusive recognition.
(2) The right to use concerted activities as a means of spreading
collective bargaining was nourished by a broad laissez fairg philoso-
phy. In competitive industries the nonunion employer and his em-
ployees were in constant competition with the union and its
members. If concerted action was a legitimate weapon in what
Holmes called "the free struggle for life,"29 as it came to be under
the philosophy of the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts, it made
little difference whether the unorganized employees joined a union
because they wished to join, because the employer forced them tojoin in order to save his business, or because the power of the union
to deprive them of jobs by shutting down the business left no viable
alternative. Any sacrifice of their desires or of the employer's inter-
ests was a cost of one form of competition. 30 "Top-down organizing"
is obviously inconsistent with the NLRA ideal of employee self-or-
ganization without interference by employers. A union's exertion of
economic pressure upon employees may also be inconsistent with
the ideal of freedom of choice.
(3) A union's need for economic weapons with which to extend its
organization was reduced by the inhibitions which the Wagner Act
imposed upon employers, and the force of an employer's claim to
the protection of his business was increased.
The impact of the Wagner Act upon the use of strikes and picket-
ing as organizing methods was first manifested in section 8(b) (4)
29. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (dis-
senting opinion).
30. E.g., Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 27
Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d 891 (1946); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. RBlkn, 245
N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
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(C) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce employees
to strike or to refuse to perform their normal services, with an object
of requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization, if another representative has been certified.
During the period for which a certification bars a new election,
this prohibition is necessary to give effect to the will of the majority
and to protect the employer against economic pressure intended to
compel him to violate the law or to punish him for compliance. The
cases holding that minority strikes and picketing are prevented by
a prior certification for an indefinite period 31 carry the rule beyond
its justification. Once the employer is relieved of the legal duty to
bargain with the certified union, the only question is what tech-
niques should be open to a union which may now lawfully seek to
become the majority's choice.3 2
In one respect section 8(b) (4) (C) was obviously incomplete. A
collective bargaining agreement with a representative freely desig-
nated by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit bars an election for a reasonable period, usually two years.33
Minority picketing for union recognition or organizational purposes
during this period, like picketing during the first year of a certifica-
tion, seeks to override the will of the majority and to compel the
employer to violate his legal obligations. The Landrum-Griffin
amendments fill the gap by making it an unfair labor practice to
picket for such purposes
where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may
not appropriately be raised under section 9 (c) of this Act.
A certification carries a high degree of assurance that the incum-
bent union was the free majority choice. However, there is no such
guaranty in a collective agreement. If the NLRB is content to be
guided by the formal acts, section 8(b) (7) (A) may become a
refuge for unscrupulous employers and racketeer unions. The words
of the amendment, read with appreciation of its rationale, invite a
more penetrating inquiry. They prohibit the picketing only if the
employer recognized the union 'lawfully" and "in accordance with
this Act." It is unlawful and contrary to the act for an employer to
recognize a union which has not been designated by a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit or which is the beneficiary of
31. Parks v. Atlanta Printing Pressmen & Assistant's Union No. 8, 243 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1957); Tungsten Mining Corp. v. District 50, United Mine Workers, 242
F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1957); Tungsten Mining Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953).
32. See text beginning at note 38 infra.
33. 22 NLRB ANN. REP. 18-19 (1957).
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an unfair labor practice.3 4 A contract does not prevent raising a
question of representation, unless the union had an uncoerced ma-
jority at the time the contract was signed and there was no conflict-
ing claim to recognition.35 Section 8(b) (7) (A) can be made an
effective instrument for carrying out the basic policies of the act
without damaging the legitimate interests of any bona Rde union,
if these questions are carefully investigated by the General Counsel
and thoroughly litigated in the district court and the NLRB before
an injunction or cease and desist order is issued.3 6
Read literally, section 8(b) (7) (A) would prohibit a union from
picketing an employer in an effort to organize a unit of production
workers, if the employer had a contract with another union covering
a unit of maintenance workers. It also speaks too closely of inability
to raise a question of representation under section 9(c), which
might literally cover any case in which the union could not prove
that thirty per cent of the members desired it to represent them.
The rationale should make it clear that only the contract bar is
material and that the prohibition does not go beyond picketing to
organize, or to secure recognition in, a bargaining unit in which an
election is barred by the outstanding agreement.
In both state decisions and NLRB reasoning there has been a
tendency to distinguish picketing for recognition from organizational
picketing.37 The Landrum-Griffin amendments wisely ignore the
purely verbal distinction and treat them alike. Apart from the pro-
vision mentioned above, the amendments rest upon two distinctions.
First, picketing in any form is treated as a legitimate organizing
weapon until the employees have expressed their wishes in an NLRB
election. Picketing is prohibited thereafter, except by a certified
union, for the twelve-month period in which no new election could
be held.38 The prohibition of picketing after a majority vote "No
Union" expands the notion of freedom of choice beyond the Wagner
84. Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Feb. 9, 1959).
35. 22 NLRB ANN. REP. 24 (1957).
86. There is no necessary inconsistency between the above interpretation and the
amendment to NLRA § 10(1) which directs the regional attorney not to apply
for a temporary restraining order if a charge has been filed against the employer
under § 8(a)(2). The proviso is applicable to all subdivisions of § 8(b)(7) and
represents a compromise between the view that there should never be a temporary
injunction where the employer was charged with any unfair labor practice and the
argument that this would put it in the power of unions to stall injunction proceedings
indefinitely. The above interpretation deals only with § 8(b) (7) and would seem
to rest solidly upon its words.
37. E.g., Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y. 532, 122 N.E.2d 386 (1954); Anchorage,
Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 801, 388 Pa. 547, 119 A.2d 199 (1956).
38. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (C), 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1952); Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(B),
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch.-, § 704(c), 73
Stat.-. See text beginning at note 83 supra.
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Act's guaranty of freedom to choose a collective bargaining repre-
sentative into freedom to have none, for it guarantees freedom
against the economic pressures of picketing as well as against inter-
ference by employers. This is an expansion of the concept of free-
dom of choice embraced by the Wagner Act, but it is necessary to
prevent organized groups in key industries from using their often
overwhelming economic power to attach other appropriate bargain-
ing units as satellites. The Teamsters Union, for example, appears
to have compelled employees to designate it as their bargaining
representative against their wishes, threatening to use organizational
picketing to destroy the business upon which their jobs depended.
The national labor policy should encourage collective bargaining
but not at the cost of permitting powerful groups to destroy the
right of self-determination.
Banning organizational picketing after an NLRB election partially
rejects the free struggle for life, for it prefers the nonunion em-
ployees' interest in self-determination over the union's interest in
spreading its organization as a means of protecting its wage scale
and labor standards. Suppose, however, that a union were to picket
for the avowed purpose of publicizing the low wages paid in an
establishment, without becoming the bargaining representative, in
order to compel the owner to raise his wages to the union scale or
else to prevent the distribution of the low-cost, nonunion goods in
direct competition with the products of union labor. NLRA section
8(b) (7) prohibits picketing only
where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees or
• .. the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organiza-
tion as their collective bargaining representative ...
The very few men close to the drafting of the Conference Report
who understood this problem had no common intention- perhaps
"had conflicting intentions" would be a better phrase. Presumably,
the NLRB will follow the decisions under section 8(b) (4) (C)
which hold that picketing in support of a demand which is custom-
arily made in collective bargaining is picketing for recognition.3 I
am inclined to think that the decisions are wrong, and they are op-
posed by a few judicial rulings distinguishing picketing to protest
the competition.4" The prohibition seeks to protect the employees'
decision concerning union representation, not their freedom to work
39. International Ass'n of Machinists, 121 N.L.R.B. No. 170 (Oct. 18, 1958);
Teamsters Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
40. International Bhd. of Carpenters v. Todd L. Storms Constr. Co., 84 Ariz. 120,
324 P.2d 1002 (1958); Standard Grocer Co. v. Local 406, AFL, 821 Mich. 276, 82
N.W.2d 519 (1948); cf. Douds v. Knit Goods Workers, Local 155, 147 F. Supp. 345
(E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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at substandard wages without reprisal from those who are injured.
The union's objective of eliminating the competition based upon
differences in labor standards can be accomplished without inter-
fering with the decision concerning union representation. The dan-
ger in distinguishing picketing to protest substandard wages or work-
hag conditions from picketing for union recognition or organization
is that it may encourage verbal evasions through disingenuous
phrasing of the pickets' placards and the union's demands. The best
solution would be to treat the union's objective as a question of fact.
Normally recognition or union organization are objectives of any
picketing of an unorganized shop, but the force of this presumption,
based upon experience, can be dissipated by proof that the labor
conditions of which the union complains are presently such a sub-
stantial threat to existing union standards in other shops as to
support a finding that the union has a genuine interest in compelling
the improvement of the labor conditions or eliminating the compe-
tition, even though the union does not become the bargaining
representative.
Picketing before a union election is divided by section 8(b) (7)
into two categories: (1) picketing which halts pick-ups or deliveries
by independent trucking concerns or the rendition of services by
the employees of other employers, and (2) picketing which appeals
only to employees in the establishment and members of the public.
The distinction is in terms of consequences rather than intent, be-
cause motives are too difficult to disentangle. The theory is that the
former class of picketing is essentially a signal to organized economic
action backed by group discipline. Such economic pressure, if con-
tinued, causes heavy loss and increases the likelihood of the em-
ployer's coercing the employees to join the union. In the second
type of picketing, the elements of communication predominate. If
the employer loses patronage, it is chiefly because of the impact of
the picket's message upon members of the public acting as individ-
uals.41 The NLRB, in administering section 8(b) (7), should recog-
nize that the statute draws a line between two courses of conduct.
Proof of a few widely separated instances of a trucker's refusal to
cross a publicity picket line should not convert it into signal
picketing.
Congress placed no limitation upon the period for which a union
may engage in publicity picketing. Signal picketing is treated as a
41. This distinction between "signal picketing" and "publicity picketing" has
been noted in discussions of the question whether picketing should be protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments as a method of communication, but it attracted
no significant judicial support. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 871,
198 P.2d 885, 897-98 (1948) (Traynor, J., dissenting); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and
the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rnv. 574, 591-97 (1951).
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legitimate organizing tactic until the election has been held; but to
prevent the union from avoiding an election by disclaiming, or
avoiding a claim of representation rights, section 8(b) (7) (D) pro-
hibits signal picketing for more than a reasonable period, not to
exceed 30 days, without filing a petition upon which the NLRB is
to proceed forthwith to an election. The signal picketing may then
continue until the election is held. After the election, all picketing,
signal or publicity, is forbidden for reasons explained above.
Section 8(b) (7) directs the NLRB to proceed "forthwith" when
a petition for an election is filed because of organizational picketing.
The immediate objective was to protect employers against pro-
longed picketing, but the provision giving regional offices authority
to conduct elections without referring a case to the full Board
manifests a broader purpose to speed up all elections.4" No dis-
tinction should be made between employers' petitions and unions'
petitions in the administration of section 8(b) (7) (C).
Under the Curtis Bros.4 3 and Alloy" doctrines, the NLRB inter-
preted section 8(b) (1) to impose some restrictions upon organiza-
tional activities which are more severe than section 8(b) (7)
provisions -the Alloy case, for example, forbids the organizing of a
consumer boycott after an election even though there is no picketing,
whereas section 8(b)(7) forbids only picketing- but in other
instances section 8(b) (7) is the more restrictive. The final sentence
of this section provides:
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b).
Does this mean that the more severe restrictions imposed by the
Curtis and Alloy doctrines survive under section 8(b) (1) if they
are a proper interpretation of the statute? The words will bear this
meaning. It would seem wrong, however, to interpret the vague
words of section 8(b) (1) as a license for administrative and judicial
construction of restrictions upon concerted activities as organiza-
tional techniques after Congress had sharply debated the issue and
expressed its conclusions in section 8(b) (7). The troublesome
sentence can equally well be read as a caveat intended to eliminate
the risk that the new section 8(b) (7) would be taken to restrict
the prohibitions upon secondary boycotts or jurisdictional disputes.
The Statement of the Managers on the part of the House
provides:
42. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch.-, §
701(b), 73 Stat. -, amending Labor Management Relations Act § 3(b).
43. Drivers, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), reo'd,
- F.2d -, (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959).
44. International Ass'n of Machinists, 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957), enforced in part
and set aside in part, 263 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28
U.S.L. W= 3002 (U.S. April 24, 1959) (No. 57).
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Section 8(b) (7) overrules the Curtis and Alloy cases to the extent that
those decisions are inconsistent with section 8(b) (7). 45
If the reference to the Curtis and Alloy cases directs attention to the
NLRB decisions, the Statement supports the argument that their
more restrictive aspects survive. However, the circuit courts had
reversed the NLRB, and the function of the Statement may be to
explain that the court decisions are overruled to the extent that
section 8(b) (7) forbids organizational picketing.
It may clarify the situation to recount the pertinent events. The
ambiguous sentence in the statute was not overlooked. On the part
of the Senate, the fear was expressed that it might keep alive the
litigation over the Curtis and Alloy doctrines and thus lead to ju-
dicial and administrative restrictions in addition to those imposed
by section 8(b) (7). The answer disclaimed such an intent, but the
proponents of the Landrum-Griffin bill were unwilling to delete the
sentence, for fear that the deletion might somehow be construed
to imply that section 8(b)(7) qualified section 8(b)(4) or other
provisions prohibiting unfair labor practices having nothing to do
with the use of picketing or other publicity in an organizing cam-
paign. The difference was resolved by the suggestion that the House
Managers should include the following statement in their explana-
tion of the Conference Agreement:
The final sentence in proposed section 8(b) (7) is intended to make it
clear that section 8(b) (7) does not qualify any of the other unfair labor
practices under section 8(b). Section 8(b) (7) is, of course, intended as
a definitive legislative disposition of the problems involved in the Curtis
and Alloy cases.
This passage was mimeographed on a sheet containing two similar
passages compromising other issues, distributed and read aloud at
a later meeting of conferees with the staff present, and approved
without dissent. The Statement of the House Managers had not
been prepared when the Senate voted. It was not shown to the
Senate staff. Instead of the agreed explanation, it contained the
sentence quoted above. The meaning would be the same if the actual
Statement means that the court decisions in the Curtis and Alloy
cases are overruled where inconsistent with section 8 (b) (7).
The treatment of organizational picketing in the bill compromises
conflicting interests. Signal picketing is an economic weapon which
may seriously injure an employer's business and exert sufficient eco-
nomic pressure upon the employees to coerce their choice of repre-
sentatives. It can be argued that such a method of organizing is un-
necessary and inappropriate today because the NLRA prevents
coercion by employers. On the other hand, the union members have
an important economic interest in protecting their wages and work-
45. 105 CONG. Rsc. 16552 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
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ing conditions. The protection against employer interference avail-
able under the NLRA is imperfect, because of the delays and
uncertainties of litigation, the manifold opportunities for subtle dis-
crimination, and the coercion exercised through freedom of expres-
sion. Since all unionization involves a revolution against the estab-
lished order, the demonstration that there is another power factor
in the situation may be essential to spark the revolt. The relative
weights assignable to these considerations vary from case to case -
there are instances in which two days of organizational picketing is
an outrage and others in which a year of picketing would be bene-
ficial- yet the necessary appraisals are too particularized for prac-
tical administration. One's final judgment depends partly upon the
degree of his reluctance to curtail a weapon of self-advancement
and partly upon his appraisal of the value of further unionization.
In my opinion, section 8(b) (7) strikes as fair a balance as has yet
been suggested, provided that the inadequacies of the draftsman-
ship are remedied by understanding administration.
IV. SECONDARY BoYcoTrs
The Landrum-Griffin bill makes extensive and important changes
in the law pertaining to secondary boycotts and "hot cargo" agree-
ments. One group of changes closes technical loopholes in the Taft-
Hartley Act. A second expands the prohibition upon secondary
boycotts to include the organization of primary boycotts among
business firms. The third revision extends the Taft-Hartley prohibi-
tion against inducing secondary refusals to work to include inducing
secondary refusals to patronize.
(1) There was complete agreement about closing the technical
loopholes if the legislation included Taft-Hartley amendments. In
its original form, section 8(b) (4) (A) prohibited inducement of
"the employees of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment .. "
This provision did not apply to the inducement of railroad, airline,
and public employees, or supervisors, because they are not techni-
cally "employees" as defined by section 2(2), or to inducement of an
individual, because the plural form, "employees," was used. But sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A), as revised, prohibits the inducement of
"any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment. .. "
These words obviously encompass the groups heretofore inadvert-
ently excluded.
(2) The sharpest controversy revolved around the expansion of
section 8(b) (4) (A) into a prohibition of certain primary activities.
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Historically, a boycott is a refusal to have dealings with an of-
fending person. To induce customers not to buy from an offending
grocery store is to organize a primary boycott. To persuade grocery
stores not to buy Swift products is also a primary boycott. In each
case the only economic pressure is levelled at the offending per-
son-in terms of labor cases, at the employer involved in the labor
dispute.
The element of "secondary activity" is introduced when there
is a refusal to have dealings with one who has dealings with the
offending person. For example, there is a secondary boycott when
housewives refuse to buy at any grocery store which deals with
Swift & Co. For members of the Plumbers Union to refuse to work
for any contractor who buys pipe from the United States Pipe Co.
is, strictly speaking, a secondary strike but is called a secondary
boycott and is, of course, the only kind of secondary activity which
was prohibited under the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, there are two
employers in every secondary boycott resulting from a labor dispute.
Picketing at the scene of a labor dispute often requires the draw-
ing of fine distinctions between primary and secondary activities.
NLRA section 8(b) (4) (A) obviously makes it unlawful for the
Teamsters Union to induce the employees of the ABC Express Co.
to refuse to transport furniture delivered at the ABC terminal by
the Modem Furniture Co., some of whose employees are on strike,
for one of the Teamsters Union's objectives would be to force the
express company to cease doing business with the furniture com-
pany. Suppose, however, a second case, where the furniture com-
pany telephones the express company to pick up the furniture at
the factory, but the strikers dissuade the express company's drivers
from entering. The refusal to cross the picket line, not the strike,
applies the economic pressure. The words of section 8(b) (4) (A)
are equally as applicable as in the first case, but the NLRB and
lower court decisions have held that in the second case there is no
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, chiefly because turning people
away from the scene of a labor dispute is an incident of a primary
strike rather than of a secondary boycott.4 The Supreme Court also
adopted this interpretation in the Rice Milling case, but the opinion
stressed the point that section 8(b) (4) (A) prohibited inducements
to engage in a "concerted refusal." 47 Since the Landrum-Griffin bill
deleted this phrase, it might have overturned the entire line of
decisions. A majority of the Senate conferees secured the inclusion
of explicit language safeguarding primary picketing even though
truck drivers are stopped by the pickets.
46. 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 111-12 (1956).
47. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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Suppose that prior to the strike at Modem Furniture Co. the
Teamsters Union had induced all the trucking concerns in the area
to agree that they would not require their employees to handle the
goods of an employer engaged in a labor dispute. Would it now be
an unfair labor practice for the Teamsters Union to induce the
express company's employees to refuse to handle the furniture?
For six or seven years these "hot cargo" contracts were held to
legitimatize the secondary boycott,4" but in 1957 the Supreme
Court held that the clause was not the basis of a valid defense.49
If the trucker performed his promise voluntarily, without the
Teamsters Union inducing his employees not to work, there would
be only a primary boycott and no violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Many observers felt that this was an impractical distinction. The
effect upon the furniture company is the same as if the trucker did
not carry the goods because the union induced his employees to
refuse to handle them. Furthermore, one wonders about the truck-
er's "voluntary" participation in the primary boycott. Would he
sign the "hot cargo" clause except under pressure from the Team-
sters Union? Is it not likely that he would perform it only be-
cause he feared that if he did not the Teamsters Union might be
more demanding in the next contract negotiations, or might re-
mind the trucker of his failure to perform his part of the con-
tract whenever he asked the union to halt a wildcat strike? The
only way of dealing with such pressures is to nip them in the bud
by prohibiting the agreements. Apart from the participation of the
labor union, even as primary boycotts such agreements would vio-
late the Sherman Act.50
This was the theory upon which the Senate voted to outlaw "hot
cargo" contracts in the trucking industry. In the House the prohibi-
tion was expanded to all agreements by which an employer agrees
with a labor organization not to handle or use the goods of another
person. The fear has been expressed that the prohibition would in-
validate agreements sanctioning conduct like the refusal of the truck
drivers to cross the picket line at our hypothetical Modem Fur-
niture Co. plant. However, the rationale of the new law points
to a narrower interpretation. Section 8(b) (4) (A) refers to all in-
ducements of employees of a secondary employer which are di-
rected toward forcing him "to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
48. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd, 195 F.2d
906 (2 Cir. 1952).
49. Local 1976, Int'l Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
50. Boycotts appear to be per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). See Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person." But under the Rice Milling case and the
new confirmatory proviso, as explained above,5 1 it does not con-
stitute an unlawful secondary boycott to induce employees to refuse
to cross a primary picket line where the refusal causes the second-
ary employer to cease doing business with the primary employer
at the site of the labor dispute. The same words are repeated in
outlawing "hot cargo" agreements. The prohibition was drafted
in aid of the restriction upon secondary boycotts. The same dis-
tinction based upon the situs should therefore be observed, with
the result that section 8(e) would not prohibit agreements sanc-
tioning refusal to cross a lawful primary picket line.
Although the language leaves doubt, the underlying rationale
should also exclude from section 8(e) conventional restrictions
upon subcontracting such as the promise that
all work that is usually performed in the plants of the Company shall
continue to be performed in such plants unless a change is mutually
agreed upon by both parties.
In a literal sense this clause is an agreement between an em-
ployer and a union by which the employer undertakes not to do
business with any other person, but it has a different function from
the contracts which were the targets of section 8(e). A restriction
upon subcontracting which seeks to protect the wages and job
opportunities of the employees covered by the contract, by for-
bidding the employer from having certain kinds of business done
outside his own shop, is quite different in purpose and effect from
blacklisting specified employers or groups of employers because
their products or labor policies are objectionable to the union. The
fact that Congress rejected the attacks upon the secondary boy-
cott provisions of the Landrum-Griffin bill which alleged that the
bill unwisely threw doubt upon the validity of bona fide restrictions
upon subcontracting, may be attributed to disbelief in the allegation
just as easily as to congressional opposition to contractual restrictions
upon managerial freedom to subcontract, although there were un-
doubtedly individuals who hoped also to resolve the subcontract-
ing issue in favor of management. Whatever the merits of the
latter issue, it is distinct from the only explicit subject of legislative
concern.
The prohibition of "hot cargo" contracts is the most vulnerable
of the Landrum-Griffn amendments. In the trucking industry, it
will serve a useful purpose. The apparel and clothing industries
were excepted, because there the prohibition would have raised
havoc. Congress had no information about the prevalence or use
51. See text following note 47 supra.
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of similar clauses in other industries- about their impact upon
employers or their importance to union organization. The majority
was content to make the loose assumption that a clause which was
contrary to public policy in the transportation industry must be
equally undesirable in other segments of the economy.
(8) The other major change in the law of secondary boycotts
is the partial restriction of consumer boycotts. Section 8(b) (4) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act forbade only the inducement of "em-
ployees" to engage in a concerted refusal to work "in the course of
their employment." The amendments make it unlawful "to threaten,
coerce or restrain any person" where an object is to force him to
cease doing business with any other person.
Standing alone, as it did in the Landrum-Griffin bill, this lan-
guage seemed to invite rulings that organizing a consumer boycott
of a store which sold the products of a manufacturer with whom"
the union was engaged in a labor dispute would become an unfair
labor practice. A majority of the Senate conferees objected to this
change in the law. There is some reason to think that originally
the Republicans and Southern Democrats among the House con-
ferees failed to realize that the words were broad enough to reach
consumer boycotts and would have agreed to eliminate the pro-
hibition, but President Eisenhower's radio and television appear-
ance placed them in a dilemma. The speech contained an example
of secondary picketing which had either to be read as an inducement
of employees to engage in a secondary strike, in which case the
President had displayed ignorance by demanding that Congress
outlaw conduct which had been unlawful for twelve years, or as
a demand for a law against picketing which caused a secondary
consumer boycott. The sponsors of the Landrum-Griffin bill stood
immovably upon the second alternative. The Senate conferees, there-
fore, sought to narrow the restriction to the exact illustration used
by the President. This is the reason for the proviso which permits
unfair lists, radio broadcasts, newspaper advertising, sound trucks
and every other form of publicity except picketing, for the purpose
of inducing consumers to boycott an unfair product or a distributor
who does business with an unfair producer. The qualification is jus-
tified by the distinction which we noted in section 8(b) (7) between
appeals to individuals as members of the public, whether union
members or not, and concerted refusals to work backed by the pres-
sure and possibly by the discipline of an organized group. I suspect
that the distinction between signal and publicity picketing would
also have been introduced if it were not for the curious turn of
events which made this politically impossible for the sponsors of the
Landrum-Grifin amendments.
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